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Abstract: Critics have recently argued that reliabilists face trade-off problems, forcing them to condone intuitively 
unjustified beliefs when they generate lots of true belief further downstream. What these critics overlook is that 
reliabilism entails that there are side-constraints on belief-formation, on account of which there are some things you 
should not believe, even if doing so would have very good epistemic consequences. However, we argue that by 
embracing side-constraints the reliabilist faces a dilemma: she can either hold on to reliabilism, and with it 
aforementioned side-constraints, but then needs to explain why we should allow the pursuit of justification to get in 
the way of the acquisition of true belief; or she can deny that there are side-constraints—and in effect give up on 
reliabilism. We’ll suggest that anyone moved by the considerations that likely attract people to reliabilism in the first 
place—the idea the true belief is good, and as such should be promoted—should go for the second horn, and instead 
pursue a form of epistemic utilitarianism. 
 
1. Reliabilism and the Intrapersonal Trade-off Problem 
Consequentialists believe that what’s right should be understood in terms of what’s good. For 
example, for the classic utilitarian, it’s right to give to charity when it maximizes happiness. 
Similarly, in epistemology, the reliabilist (e.g., Goldman 1979) believes the following: 
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RELIABILISM: A belief is justified only if it is formed by a process that tends to issue in true 
belief.1 
 
Recently, opponents of reliabilism have suggested that this similarity lands her in trouble. 
Utilitarians infamously face interpersonal trade-offs where the suffering of some must be traded 
for the benefit of others (e.g., Thomson 1976). According to her critics, the reliabilist faces 
intrapersonal trade-offs, where unjustified beliefs must be formed by a person to increase her 
accuracy with respect to future beliefs (Berker 2013a, b, Littlejohn 2012, Jenkins 2007, Firth 1981; 
cf. Greaves 2013). 
However, these critics are mistaken. For one thing, the supposed trade-off cases put forward 
to date do not present a problem for the reliabilist; they’re all either not trade-offs the reliabilist 
needs to make, or not problematic trade-offs (Ahlstrom-Vij and Dunn 2014; Goldman 2015). For 
example, a simple trade-off problem would consist in the reliabilist needing to condone a belief 
formed in light of excellent evidence to the contrary, that would have as a causal consequence a 
great many true beliefs in the future. But since the reliabilist evaluates the justificatory status of 
beliefs, not with reference to its consequences, but with reference to the direct (more on this below) 
consequences of the type of process that generates it, the reliabilist doesn’t have to condone the 
formation of such a belief, since forming a belief in light of excellent evidence to the contrary 
arguably constitutes an unreliable process. 
                                               
1 We have stated this as a necessary condition, since this is something that all reliabilists will agree on and because this 
is all we need for our arguments to go through. Reliabilists tend to add to RELIABILISM, however, to yield necessary 
and sufficient conditions for justification. For instance, Goldman (1979) accepts this necessary condition and adds a 
kind of ‘no defeater’ clause to get a sufficient condition. Similarly, this necessary condition is part of his account of 
strong justification (Goldman 1992c); his normal worlds reliabilism (Goldman 1986), where justification is a function of 
reliability in the actual world (assumed to be normal), rigidified for all words; and his virtue reliabilism (Goldman 1992b), 
where virtues earn their keep by being reliable. 
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Further, and perhaps more importantly, while reliabilism is indeed a form of 
consequentialism, it’s not of a kind on which we should even expect trade-off problems to arise 
in the first place (Dunn and Ahlstrom-Vij 2017). The type of consequentialism on which we should 
expect trade-off problems is one that doesn’t impose any side-constraints (e.g., Nozick 1981). In 
ethics, imposing side-constraints on actions is to maintain that it can be wrong to do something, 
even if it has very good (including the best) consequences (e.g., because it violates people’s rights). 
In epistemology, imposing side-constraints amounts to holding that there are some things you 
should not believe, even if doing so would have very good (including the best) epistemic 
consequences. But the reliabilist accepts that. She holds that if a belief is formed by an unreliable 
process, then it is not justified. Moreover:  
 
NORMATIVE GLOSS: If someone’s belief that p is or would be unjustified, then she should 
not believe that p (in that way, at that time).2 
 
Consider, for instance, the following from Alvin Goldman, arguably the most prominent reliabilist: 
 
Calling a belief justified implies that it is a proper doxastic attitude, one to which the cognizer 
has an epistemic right or entitlement. These notions have a strong deontic flavor […]. They 
are naturally captured in the language of ‘permission’ and ‘prohibition’ (Goldman 1986: 59). 
 
If Goldman is right—and we suspect most reliabilists would find little to object to here—then 
RELIABILISM entails: 
 
                                               
2 As the quotation from Goldman immediately below this makes clear, the ‘should’ is to be understood as an epistemic 
sense, not in a more general all-things-considered sense. The same holds for future uses of ‘should’ in this paper. 
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SIDE-CONSTRAINTS: There are some things you should not believe, even if doing so 
would have very good (including the best) epistemic consequences. 
 
Specifically, if a belief would be formed by way of an unreliable process, that’s a belief you should 
not hold (in that way, at that time), even if it would have very good epistemic consequences. Hence, 
it shouldn’t come as a surprise that reliabilism doesn’t fall prey to intrapersonal trade-off problems. 
That said, we will argue that it’s not clear that the reliabilist should want to embrace SIDE-
CONSTRAINTS. We will suggest that reflecting on realistic cases in which the best way to 
promote true belief in society at large is by having people form unjustified beliefs makes clear that 
the reliabilist faces a dilemma. On the one hand, she can hold on to reliabilism, and the prohibition 
against unreliably formed but truth-conducive beliefs. But in so doing, she must explain why we 
should allow the pursuit of justification to get in the way of the acquisition of true belief, all while 
holding that justification is valuable merely as a means to true belief. On the other hand, she can 
maintain that it is the acquisition of true belief that matters, but then drop the prohibition against 
unreliably formed but truth-conducive belief. In so doing, however, the reliabilist gives up on 
reliabilism. We’ll suggest that anyone moved by the considerations that likely attract people to 
reliabilism in the first place—the idea the true belief is good, and as such should be promoted—
should go for the second horn of that dilemma, and instead pursue a form of epistemic utilitarianism. 
Before fleshing out the details of our argument, we should make a point about our target. 
Much of our attention will be on Goldman, and thereby on what one might think of as classic 
reliabilism, as captured by RELIABILISM. However, we won’t be engaging directly with one 
prominent form of reliabilism in contemporary epistemology, namely virtue reliabilism (e.g., Sosa 
2015 and 2009; Greco 2010). The reason is not that we think that virtue reliabilism is not a form 
of reliabilism, but that in previous work we have already argued that virtue reliabilism is reducible 
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to classic reliabilism.3 Repeating the relevant arguments here would consume a substantial amount 
of space that we need in order to achieve the main goal of the paper: to offer a sustained argument 
against (classic) reliabilism, and provide the outlines of the type of view we believe reliabilists—
virtue reliabilists included—should pursue in its stead.   
 
2. Side-constraints and Aggregation 
In fleshing out the dilemma for the reliabilist, it’s helpful to turn to Goldman’s social epistemology. 
Goldman suggests that ‘[s]ocial practices are epistemically desirable to the extent that they promote 
epistemically preferred belief-profiles’ (1992a: 194). What profiles are preferred? ‘The central 
epistemological concepts of appraisal, I argue, invoke true belief as their ultimate aim. So the 
evaluation of epistemic procedures, methods, processes, or arrangements must appeal to truth-
conduciveness’ (1986: 3). Social practices are to be evaluated—exclusively, as far as we can tell—by 
how well they raise ‘the aggregate level of [true belief] of an entire community’ (1999: 93). But there 
are a variety of unreliable means to that end. To see why, keep in mind two facts we introduced at 
the outset: first, that the reliabilist evaluates beliefs, not with reference to their consequences, but 
with reference to the consequences of the types of processes that generate them; and, second, that 
such processes are evaluated with reference to their direct consequences. Elsewhere (Ahlstrom-Vij 
                                               
3 Specifically, we have argued (Ahlstrom-Vij 2017) that knowing full well, in Sosa’s (2015) sense, does not add anything 
substantive to what Sosa in earlier work refers to as reflective knowledge (e.g., in his 2009), and that such knowledge in 
turn is reducible to animal knowledge, or reliable belief-formation that is creditable to the agent. Moreover, creditable 
epistemic success in that sense—which is also the sense we find in Greco (2010)—is reducible to belief-formation 
that is both reliable and safe (i.e., such that it would not easily issue in false belief, were circumstances only slightly 
different), which in turn is reducible to belief-formation that is reliable in a manner that’s modally robust, in the sense 
of reliable not only in the actual world but in nearby worlds as well (Ahlstrom-Vij 2015). This means that virtue 
reliabilism is reducible to a modal version of the type of classic reliabilism discussed in this paper, and that it—if 
motivated at all—will be motivated in the terms to be discussed in what follows. 
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and Dunn 2014), we’ve put this point in terms of reliabilism being both indirect (in its evaluation 
of beliefs) and direct (in its evaluation of processes). While the indirect nature of reliabilism follows 
from our definition in RELIABILISM, its directness does not. So, a word is in order by way of 
motivating the latter.  
Say that I’m trying to locate some particular book in my bookshelf. Some psychological 
process will be at work, and when evaluating the belief ‘There’s the book I’m looking for’, the 
reliabilist will evaluate the reliability of that process. If the visual processes involved in locating the 
book are reliable, that belief will be justified. But there’s a sense in which the consequences of that 
process extend far beyond the aforementioned visual belief. Once I’ve located the book, I might 
start reading it and form a great number of beliefs as a result. Those beliefs might lead me down 
a variety of different lines of inquiry, that in turn will have a multitude of doxastic consequences. 
But the reliabilist doesn’t factor in all of those consequences when trying to determine whether the 
visual process that originally led me to the book is reliable. The only consequences relevant to the 
reliability of that process are the direct doxastic consequences of that type of process being 
instantiated, which, very roughly, will be evaluated in terms of the truth-ratio of the set of beliefs 
formed as a direct result of looking for purposes of visually locating things. 
We can now see why the reliabilist is forced to accept that there are a variety of ways to raise 
the raise the aggregate level of true belief in a community by way of unreliable belief-formation. 
Consider a real-life case: 
 
CLIMATE CHANGE: Climate change deniers believe many false things about climate 
change, while climate change believers believe many true things. But it’s also highly likely 
that most deniers and believers have reached their respective conclusions through politically 
motivated reasoning (PMR). PMR involves ‘the formation of beliefs that maintain a person’s 
status in [an] affinity group united by shared values’ (Kahan 2016: 2). Believing in man-made 
climate change is not what ‘people like me’ do if I’m a conservative; but it is what ‘people like 
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me’ do if I’m a liberal. And the distribution of belief that we see on the matter reflects this. 
 
Is PMR reliable? Note two things. First, there is not a unique type of belief-forming process 
involved in all cases of PMR. But it’s likely that there is some family of psychological processes 
involved, and that this family can be functionally defined along the lines of believing that p because it 
fits with my political affiliations. Second, the processes in this family are (in the actual world) unreliable. 
We can see this by noting that there are many different political affiliations and so different beliefs 
that will fit with those affiliations. It cannot be that most such beliefs are true, because many of 
these are in conflict with each other.4  
Still, the processes involved in PMR can, in the right scenarios, lead to many true beliefs 
both directly and further downstream. This is already the case for many climate change believers—
in this case, PMR has worked out well from the point of view of accuracy, on account of the 
reliability of those deferred to. Furthermore, work on science communication suggests that PMR 
can be utilized to increase the accuracy of climate change deniers, too, by offering information in 
a way that caters to their particular values (Kahan et al. 2015) or by rebranding experts in a manner 
that exploits deniers’ trust in particular ‘in group’ authorities (Kahan et al. 2010). Indeed, we might 
be able to say something stronger: using suitable packaging techniques in this manner might be the only 
practical way to bring deniers around to the truth about climate change. Of course, someone might suggest 
that it is better to simply get people to stop relying on PMR. But notice that, even if people did 
stop relying on PMR, it is not clear that this would increase accuracy. These are complex and 
difficult issues on which lay people would tend to (and often do) go wrong, were they to coolly 
                                               
4 This is similar to Hume’s (1975/1777) observation about miracles: Not even the religiously devout should think that 
the inference from ‘there is testimony of a miracle’ to ‘there was a miracle’ is a good one, because even if you think 
that this inference is reliable when it comes to testimony in your religious tradition, you should recognize that you think 
it fails with respect to all the other religious traditions. 
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examine the evidence and consult (but not necessarily defer to) the experts. That’s why exploiting, 
not eradicating, people’s reliance on PMR is likely to be more effective from the point of view of 
accuracy, at least in the case of climate change, even though politically motivated reasoning is not 
a reliable belief forming process.5 
There are reasons to believe that this argument generalizes to other politically divisive issues 
(see Kahan 2010). But then a reliabilist like Goldman has a problem. In a wide variety of cases, the 
reliabilist is going to recommend the formation of unjustified beliefs in order to increase the 
aggregate accuracy of the community. Remember, on NORMATIVE GLOSS, unjustified beliefs 
are ones one should not form. So, we get the following: 
 
AGGREGATION: In a wide variety of cases, the reliabilist wishing to raise the aggregate 
level of true belief will recommend that people form beliefs in ways that they should not. 
 
If this is correct, the very feature that enables the reliabilist to avoid intrapersonal trade-off 
problems—i.e., her acceptance of SIDE-CONSTRAINTS—turns out to clash with her desire to 
also raise the aggregate level of accuracy.6 How might the reliabilist respond? 
 
                                               
5 Note that the family of processes involved in PMR is not changed by the fact that it is harnessed in a situation where 
it helps improve accuracy. It is not as if instantiating the relevant processes in a scenario where they improve people’s 
changes of getting it right, changes the psychological processes involved into something like politically motivated reasoning 
in cases where it yields true belief. The psychological processes are what they are independently of when or for what 
purposes they are implemented, and hence PMR processes are still unreliable even in situations where they yield true 
belief. 
6 This is a good time to revisit footnote 1: We’ve framed our argument in terms of RELIABILISM, which holds that 
reliability is a necessary condition on justification. In the cases imagined, the processes involved are not reliable, so 
we can infer that they’re unjustified. Add to this NORMATIVE GLOSS, and you get AGGREGATION.  
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3. The Basic Motivation for Reliabilism 
Here’s a natural response: AGGREGATION is not a problem for reliabilism, but merely for 
certain reliabilists who also want to evaluate social-epistemic phenomena along consequentialist 
lines. Reliabilism is only a view about the justification of the beliefs of individuals, and carries no 
implications for whether true belief should be promoted in the aggregate. So, anyone embracing 
RELIABILISM will not, simply on account of doing so, face AGGREGATION.  
We agree. But this doesn’t make the problem go away. Think about what would drive one 
to embrace reliabilism in the first place. We submit it’s the following: 
 
BASIC MOTIVATION: True belief is epistemically good, and should as such be promoted.7 
 
Why think that BASIC MOTIVATION provides the underlying motivation for becoming a 
reliabilist? To start with, consider the following observation by Sanford Goldberg: 
 
[…] reliabilist views of doxastic justification get much of their motivation from the way they 
honor the link between truth and justification. Belief aims at truth, and particular beliefs are 
justified to the extent that [they] are formed (and sustained) in such a way that they are likely 
to be true (Goldberg 2010: 151). 
 
Defining justification in terms of processes that tend to issue in true belief, in the manner of 
Goldberg and other reliabilists, makes sense if BASIC MOTIVATION holds, since it makes clear 
how justification connects up with something that’s good and that we want promoted. As such, it 
                                               
7 The reasons involved when saying here that true belief should be promoted are pro tanto. We can imagine scenarios in 
which non-epistemic—including moral—concerns will trump any reasons we might have for promoting true belief, 
for example in so far as doing so will violate people’s rights (e.g., on account of privacy considerations). 
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also explains why we care about justification: we care about true belief, and justification helps get 
us (more of) something that we care about. Of course, it might be possible to motivate a broadly 
reliabilist account of justification in some other way—in fact, we’ll look at a number of alternative 
motivations in Section 4—but for now we simply want to point out that BASIC MOTIVATION 
seems the most natural explanation.  
Moreover, the naturalness of this particular motivation is increased by the fact that it also 
helps explain a number of other reliabilist projects, in addition to that of defining justification in 
truth-linked terms. For instance, reliabilists identify not just reliable but also powerful processes, or 
processes that generate a lot of true belief (e.g., Goldman 1992b and 1986); they offer advice to 
the individual inquirer about how to increase their chances of forming justified beliefs (Goldman 
1978 and 1986, Part II), including by providing suggestions for what experts to trust (Goldman 
2001) or what reasoning strategies to rely on (Bishop and Trout 2004); and they look to raise the 
aggregate level of true belief in society (Goldman 1999), for example by making recommendations 
about how to re-design epistemic environments in ways that protect people from bias (Ahlstrom-
Vij 2013), or how implementing certain incentive structures might help increase the reliability of 
the scientific community (Kitcher 1990). Again, the most natural explanation for why the reliabilist 
is involved in all of these projects is that she accepts BASIC MOTIVATION. 
But then we have a tension between the motivating idea behind reliabilism and the theory 
itself, as follows: 
 
BASIC TENSION: Sometimes true belief is best pursued by forming unjustified beliefs, as 
defined on RELIABILISM. Given NORMATIVE GLOSS, it follows from RELIABILISM 
that they should not form such beliefs; hence, we get SIDE-CONSTRAINTS. But if accept 
RELIABILISM on account of BASIC MOTIVATION, we think that justification is worthy 
of pursuit only because true belief is, which suggests that people (in at least some cases) 
should form those beliefs. 




That’s the deeper tension of which AGGREGATION is a symptom. Moreover, the tension puts 
the reliabilist in a dilemma. She needs to either  
 
(a)  hold on to RELIABILISM, and with it the prohibition against unreliably formed but 
truth-conducive beliefs, but then also explain why we should allow the pursuit of 
justification to get in the way of acquiring true belief, while holding that justification is 
valuable as a (mere) means to true belief; or  
 
(b)  say that it’s aggregate level of true belief that matters, and then drop the prohibition 
against unreliably formed but truth-conducive belief on the individual level—and in so 
doing give up on RELIABILISM.  
 
Given BASIC MOTIVATION, it’s difficult to see how one could go for (a). One would need to 
hold that true belief should be promoted, and that justification is valuable as a mere means to true 
belief, but that we should in some cases pursue justification at the expense of true belief. This 
would amount to a type of justification fetishism that’s incompatible with also taking it to be of 
(mere) instrumental value.8 This leaves us with (b). Since RELIABILISM entails SIDE-
CONSTRAINTS (given NORMATIVE GLOSS), rejecting the latter is to give up on the former. 
That’s the sense in which any true reliabilist—as in: any reliabilist moved by the BASIC 
                                               
8 It won’t help the reliabilist that there might be cases in which forming unjustified beliefs now will yield a great pay-
off in terms of true belief later. What (a) requires of her is to embrace SIDE-CONSTRAINTS, and the constraints 
thereby embraced would under certain circumstances force her to prioritize justification over true belief even when 
doing so does not yield any accuracy pay-off further downstream. That’s why talk of fetishism is called for here. 
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MOTIVATION—should not endorse RELIABILISM.9 
 
4. Alternative Motivations for Reliabilism 
We’ve argued that the motivation for RELIABILISM, as captured by BASIC MOTIVATION, 
should on reflection lead one to reject the former. But maybe there is some alternative motivation 
for RELIABILISM that will enable the reliabilist to block our conclusion. In this section, we’ll 
canvas four such alternatives, and argue that they all fail.  
 
4.1. Reliabilism and Intuitions 
The reliabilist might respond that what motivates reliabilism is not the idea that what’s 
epistemically right should be understood in terms of the epistemic good of true belief, or any desire 
to see more epistemically good things, but rather by the fact that that the job of the epistemologist 
is to generate theories that fit with our intuitions, and that reliabilism best fits our intuitions about 
relevant hypothetical cases.  
This is not a successful response. What processes are reliable will partly be an empirical 
matter, which is why a reliabilist account of epistemic categories often yield counter-intuitive 
                                               
9 It might be objected that someone can accept BASIC MOTIVATION, and also the idea that true belief should be 
promoted, but deny that such promotion should take the form of raising the aggregate level of accuracy. Consider, for 
example, Coady (2010) on how the distribution (not merely the aggregate level) of accuracy matters in cases where we 
have a right to know certain things. However, note two things: First, the type of cases Coady has in mind might be 
best described as ones where a general, epistemic desire to raise aggregate levels is adjusted in particular cases to factor 
in moral considerations about distribution. Coady himself would deny this, but that’s only because he holds that 
‘normative epistemology, properly understood, is a branch of ethics’ (105). Second, even if we go along with Coady, 
there’s still little comfort for the reliabilist here, as we can easily construct cases in which specific, desirable 
distributions of true belief are best promoted through unreliable processes—which should trouble the reliabilist no 
less than should AGGREGATION. 
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results, e.g., about reflection (Kornblith 2012), about surprisingly simple prediction rules (Bishop 
and Trout 2004), and about blind deference (Ahlstrom-Vij 2015). So, the claim that reliabilism best 
fits our intuitions about relevant hypothetical cases is false—there are alternative theories of 
justification that do a better job on this score. And in the absence of something like BASIC 
MOTIVATION, there’s nothing to appeal to in suggesting that we should embrace the 
implications of these investigations as opposed to simply reject RELIABILISM in favor of one of 
these alternative theories. So, whether or not reliabilists in fact are motivated by BASIC 
MOTIVATION—and we’ve already argued that the claim that they are provides a unified 
explanation of a number of reliabilist projects—they (also) should. 
Of course, the reliabilist can adjust her theory to fall in line with intuitions. But why would 
she want that to be the case? If reliabilism is made to be intuitive, it becomes unmotivated. Again, 
whether or not beliefs are justified will be hostage to empirical circumstances. We cannot assume 
that these circumstances will always (or even generally) be reflected in our intuitions about cases. 
And notice that no general skepticism about the reliance on intuitions in philosophy is required to 
make that claim. Independently of whether we are attracted to reliabilism or not, we have reason 
to believe that our intuitions might not track the empirical facts that help determine the reliability 
of any given process, including (or perhaps especially) in hypothetical circumstances, if only 
because these facts will often be surprising and far from obvious. Consequently, if you’re a 
reliabilist, there’s no good reason for seeking a particularly close fit between theory and intuitions. 
 
4.2. Reliabilism and Naturalistic Intuition Satisfying 
So, the motivation for reliabilism cannot simply be that it best captures our intuitions about 
justification. But there is a more nuanced motivation for reliabilism, which might seem to fare 
better. This motivation comes from Goldman (1979). According to this motivation, we should 
adopt a theory of justification that (i) is naturalistically acceptable and (ii) best captures our 
intuitions about justification. Goldman’s basic idea is that a theory of justification is naturalistically 
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acceptable if it makes no use of evaluative or deontic terms or concepts in its statement (90). 
Reliabilism seems to fit the bill here, since justification is specified in terms such as ‘psychological 
process’ and ‘ratio of true beliefs to false beliefs’, none of which are evaluative epistemic terms.  
Goldman doesn’t say much by way of defending the naturalistic constraint. But Kornblith 
(2018) offers a plausible motivation with reference to what Fodor says about intentionality, when 
he notes that ‘[i]f aboutness is real, it must be really something else’ (1987: 97). According to 
Kornblith, something similar is going on in the case of Goldman on justification: 
 
Being justified is not one of the fundamental properties of things, in the way that, perhaps, 
spin, charge, and charm are. Nor are any of the other epistemic properties we might explain 
justification in terms of. What this means, however, is that any account of justification which 
locates it squarely within the natural world—that is, the only world there is—must explain 
justification in non-epistemic terms. To paraphrase Fodor: If epistemic properties are real, 
they must really be something else (Kornblith 2018: 27). 
 
The idea, then, is that we have certain intuitions about justification: my belief that I have hands is 
justified, beliefs in the predictions of astrology are unjustified, and so forth. Reliabilism about 
justification vindicates these intuitions and yet is naturalistically acceptable, in that it picks out the 
natural properties that distinguish the justified from what’s not. Other theories of justification may 
do better in terms of capturing (a wider set of) intuitions, but, the thought goes, they are not 
naturalistically acceptable. Reliabilism is the unique theory that does best with respect to (ii) while 
satisfying (i). 
One way to see the problem with this motivation for reliabilism, however, is to point out 
how odd the project starts to look once we consider cases like those that occupy Goldman (1979) 
towards the end of section II of his paper. After presenting his reliabilist theory of justification, he 
considers what to say about processes of belief formation, like wishful thinking, that though 
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unreliable in our world may be reliable in other possible worlds. Goldman is indecisive in the face 
of such counterexamples. In the end, he suggests the following:  
 
What we really want is an explanation of why we count, or would count, certain beliefs as 
justified and others as unjustified. Such an explanation must refer to our beliefs about 
reliability, not to the actual facts. The reason we count beliefs as justified is that they are formed 
by what we believe to be reliable belief-forming processes. […] What matters, then, is what 
we believe about wishful thinking, not what is true (in the long run) about wishful thinking 
(Goldman 1979: 101). 
 
This is a puzzling passage. If all we are we are looking to do is determine what we believe about this 
or that particular way of forming beliefs, there is no need for a naturalistic constraint. For in that 
case, we are presumably simply mapping out our intuitions about cases. The naturalistic constraint 
only makes sense if we read Goldman in the way that Kornblith does, as being in the business of 
telling us what justification is, as in: what real features of the world distinguish what’s justified from 
what’s not. Of course, you might think that, by mapping out our intuitions, we in effect find out 
what justification (really) is. But if you to think that, and you are a reliabilist, then you would also 
have to think something along the lines of the following: once we list all of the intuitive ways of 
forming beliefs justifiably, and all of the intuitive ways of forming beliefs unjustifiably, we’ll find 
that everything in the first column is intuitively reliable, and everything in the second column is 
intuitively unreliable. But why think that? Every single intuitive counterexample to reliabilism—
including those involving evil demons, reliable clairvoyants, and so forth—should lead us to expect 
otherwise. 
This is not to suggest that the reliabilist should cease to be a reliabilist on account of these 
counterexamples; it’s to say that reliabilists should not be heavily invested in the business of trying 
to accommodate intuitions about justification in the first place. Better then to drop the 
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requirement that our account of justification should provide the best fit with our intuitions about 
cases, while holding on to the idea that we should try to understand what justification really is. 
That’s where the naturalistic constraint fits in: as Kornblith puts it, if epistemic properties are real, 
they must really be something else. But now we have a problem: if all we want is a naturalistically 
acceptable story, there will be plenty to choose from. How are we to narrow them down to arrive 
at a theory of justification? To start with, by invoking BASIC MOTIVATION. That would narrow 
down the field to those naturalistically acceptable stories that (as Goldberg put it) honor the link 
between justification and true belief. The most established story that fits the bill is RELIABILISM. 
But if what motivates the latter is BASIC MOTIVATION, we are of course back with the problem 
we started out with—which demonstrates that the attempt at an alternative motivation that can be 
found in Goldman (1979) ultimately offers no such thing. 
 
4.3. Consequentialist Intuition Satisfying 
In Goldman (1986), we get a different motivation for reliabilism, and also end up with a view that 
is subtly different from the one proposed in Goldman (1979). In his (1986), Goldman explicitly 
describes his approach as one of reflective equilibrium (60) according to which intuitions about 
justification have an important role to play. And he continues to want a theory of justification on 
which justification is defined using non-evaluative terms, though this plays a less prominent role. 
But there is also a new ingredient, which is an explicit commitment to some form of epistemic 
consequentialism. As Goldman puts it, he wants a theory of justification that is ‘truth-linked’ (69). 
More specifically, ‘[t]rue belief is the value that J-rules [rules dictating which beliefs are justified] 
should promote—really promote—if they are to qualify as right’ (103).  
These comments about epistemic consequentialism seem to go against a reliabilist account 
of justification, however, and instead in favor of an account that evaluates each belief, not with 
reference to its etiology, but in terms of its epistemic consequences. Why, then, does Goldman 
(1986) reject such a view?  
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Goldman doesn’t say10, but we suspect that the reason has to do with the fact that the theory 
we are left with does well with respect to its consequentialist credentials, but fares poorly with 
respect to our intuitions about justification. In a telling quote, Goldman considers proposals to 
‘regiment’ the concept of justification in various ways that makes it more theoretically pleasing (it 
doesn’t matter for our purposes what these regimented proposals look like). He writes: ‘Either of 
these [regimented] approaches might seem preferable from a systematic or theoretical point of 
view. Nonetheless, they do not seem to be what is implied by the ordinary conception [of 
justification] as it stands; and that is all I am currently trying to capture’ (109).  
So, in Goldman (1986) we seem to be getting the following kind of rationale for reliabilism: 
it is the theory that (i) is in some sense consequentialist in that it promotes true belief, and yet (ii) 
also satisfies our intuitions about justification. Three problems now present themselves. 
First, though he relies heavily on intuition-satisfying, he also says things that cut against it. 
For instance, in dismissing a theory of justification according to which a belief is justified just in 
case it is in conformity with the belief-forming rules accepted by one’s society, Goldman writes: 
‘Any such proposal invites an obvious objection. Why should we assume that what is accepted as 
justification-conferring by the members of a particular community really is justification-
conferring? Can’t such a community be wrong?’ (68). We agree with Goldman that the answer 
here is ‘yes.’ But then we have a problem for (ii) above, since what holds of a community’s beliefs 
about justification surely also holds of our intuitions about it, since these too would have to be 
defined with reference to some community or other. Goldman could of course drop (ii) and rely 
entirely on (i). Given what we have argued, the most natural way to proceed from this point would 
be by appealing to BASIC MOTIVATION—but then we’re back with the problem that we started 
out with. 
                                               
10 Goldman’s explicit reason is not explanatory: ‘I ignore entirely the suggestion that the justificational status of each 
belief is a function of that very belief’s consequences’ (1986: 97). 
Forthcoming in Episteme 
18 
 
Second, in explaining why he doesn’t go for a coherence-based account of justification, 
Goldman writes: ‘The fundamental standard concerns the formation of true belief. Coherence 
enters the picture only because coherence considerations are generally helpful in promoting true 
belief’ (100). Why not say the same thing about reliably formed belief? Reliably formed beliefs 
usually promote true belief, but in some cases—such as in CLIMATE CHANGE—unreliably 
formed beliefs do. So, our criterion of what makes a belief epistemically right is not that it coheres 
with other beliefs, nor is it that it is reliably produced. That’s to say that, if we go down this route, 
we have not found a motivation for reliabilism that’s separate from what might or might not be 
offered by BASIC MOTIVATION; if anything, we have found a reason to reject reliabilism on 
grounds consistent with BASIC MOTIVATION. 
Third, Goldman’s preferred criterion of rightness actually seems to permit unreliably formed 
beliefs as justified. Here it is: 
 
(ARI) A J-rule system R is right if and only if R permits certain (basic) psychological 
processes, and the instantiation of these processes would result in a truth ratio of beliefs that 
meets some specified high threshold (greater than .50). 
 
Though this has not been widely noted11, it is certainly possible that some set of psychological 
processes yields a truth ratio of beliefs above the threshold and yet one of the psychological 
processes is itself unreliable. So, Goldman’s own arguments against other views, and indeed his 
official statement of his theory, seems to give significant weight to the truth-linkedness motivation 
for reliabilism. And that is of course exactly as it should be, if BASIC MOTIVATION is what is 
driving the project. But as we have seen, this is also the very motivation that ultimately undermines 
reliabilism. 
                                               
11 See Dunn (2012) for a discussion. 




4.4. Knowledge as a Natural Kind 
So far we have focused on Goldman, and found that we run into problems when attempting to 
defend a view that honors some form of consequentialism and also best captures our intuitions. 
So, let us consider a view that depends on neither of these claims: Kornblith’s (2002) proposal to 
investigate knowledge as a natural kind. On Kornblith’s view, the proper subject matter of 
epistemology does not consist of our epistemic concepts, but rather of knowledge itself. According 
to Kornblith, we can study knowledge itself by looking at the attributions of knowledge that 
biologists and cognitive ethologists are required to make to explain the survival and evolution of 
animals with robust cognitive systems. Here is Kornblith, summing up where he thinks this 
approach takes us:  
 
The knowledge that members of a species embody is the locus of a homeostatic cluster of 
properties: true beliefs that are reliably produced, that are instrumental in the production of 
behavior successful in meeting biological needs and thereby implicated in the Darwinian 
explanation of the selective retention of traits. The various information-processing capacities 
and information-gathering abilities that animals possess are attuned to the animals’ 
environment by natural selection, and it is thus that category of beliefs that manifest such 
attunement—cases of knowledge—are rightly seen as a natural category, a natural kind 
(Kornblith 2002: 62-3). 
 
On this view, we get a naturalistic, non-intuition-based motivation for the claim that knowledge is 
reliably produced true belief. How could one leverage this into a non-intuition-based motivation 
for reliabilism about justification? The natural way to go is to claim that justification just is 
whatever we add to true belief to get knowledge. As such, justification would form a proper part 
of the homeostatic property cluster that is knowledge. 
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In evaluating this approach, let us grant Kornblith’s (controversial) claim that knowledge is 
a natural kind, which just is reliably produced true belief. Even granting this, there are problems 
in getting a motivation for reliabilism about justification out of his view. To begin with, there is a 
fairly wide consensus that adding justification to true belief does not get you knowledge. Kornblith 
might respond that this consensus is based on a type of intuition-based conceptual analysis that 
he rejects. The problem for Kornblith (were he to attempt a motivation for reliabilism along the 
lines we are considering) is that the same would have to go for the claim that justification just is 
what you add to true belief to get knowledge. That claim, too, is a kind of intuition-backed claim 
of the sort we’re supposed to be disavowing here.  
Of course, Kornblith might deny that this claim is—or at least: needs to be—motivated with 
reference to intuitions. Remember, the idea we’re considering is that justification is a proper part 
of the homeostatic property cluster that is knowledge. So, perhaps a reliabilist analysis of 
justification simply falls out of Kornblith’s account of knowledge. Or does it? What’s providing 
the explanation of the selective retention of traits, and thereby warranting the talk of a natural 
kind, is the (whole) property cluster that—following cognitive ethologists—we can call 
‘knowledge,’ not any proper part of it. If any proper part of it did provide the relevant explanation, 
then that would be the natural kind in question. So, as far as Kornblith’s account goes, we have a 
motivation for slicing the world into what’s known and not known, but not for slicing the world 
into what’s justified and not justified. That’s not to say that Kornblith’s account rules out there 
being such a motivation; it’s just to say that it doesn’t provide one. 
But maybe there’s a motivation to be had by looking at what Kornblith has to say about 
epistemic normativity more generally. According to Kornblith, ‘someone who cares about acting 
in a way that furthers the things he cares about, and that includes all of us, has pragmatic reasons 
to favor a cognitive system that is effective in generating truths, whether he otherwise cares about 
the truth’ (2002: 156). For that reason, Kornblith suggests, ‘[w]e should […] adopt a method of 
cognitive evaluation that endorses truth-conducive processes’ (156). If Kornblith is right, we have 
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a pragmatic reason to slice the world into the truth-conducive and the non-truth-conducive. But 
there are two problems here: 
The first problem is that Kornblith is likely wrong. As argued by Hazlett (2013), there is a 
‘clearly identifiable pattern of cases in which false belief is better for a person than true belief’ (63), 
on account of how self-serving illusions promote non-depression and self-esteem, in turn 
conducive to subjective well-being and the ability to cope. These are things that we want—indeed, 
possibly the things we want the most—which suggests that the relationship between true belief and 
desire satisfaction is not as straightforward as Kornblith suggests.12 
The second problem is that, even if Kornblith is right, it doesn’t help the reliabilist. It doesn’t 
follow from the fact—if it is a fact—that we all have pragmatic reason to value truth that we should 
‘adopt a method of cognitive evaluation that endorses truth-conducive processes’ (156). We’ve 
already seen why: under many circumstances—including those in CLIMATE CHANGE—the 
best way to promote true belief is not to endorse truth-conducive processes. Of course, Kornblith 
might object that we are here assuming that the processes involved are belief-forming processes. 
Perhaps the relevant processes here are instead the social processes that involve applying some 
particular accuracy-motivated intervention on a social group, such as one exploiting politically 
motivated reasoning. And if that raises the aggregate, and to that extent promotes what we all have 
reason to care about on Kornblith’s view, then maybe that’s the type of process we should endorse. 
                                               
12 It might be suggested that Hazlett’s observation thereby also calls into question BASIC MOTIVATION. In 
particular, if Hazlett is right, in what sense should true belief be promoted? One answer consistent with what’s been 
said in this paper—although we do not for present purposes need to commit to it—can actually be found in Hazlett’s 
book. Hazlett argues that evaluative practices take place within a ‘critical domain’ organized around the value of true 
belief. To the extent that we care about believing truly under some particular circumstances, epistemic evaluation will 
be relevant to us, and the ‘should’ in BASIC MOTIVATION will have force. At other times, non-epistemic 
considerations will carry greater weight—all of which accords well with the fact, highlighted in footnote 7, that the 
‘should’ in BASIC MOTIVATION is pro tanto.  
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But if Kornblith says that, then that merely highlights the fact that his account doesn’t motivate 
reliabilism after all—remember, the reliabilist would have to say that the beliefs involved in these 
cases are ones people should not form—whether independently of BASIC MOTIVATION or 
not. If anything, this offers a motivation for giving up on reliabilism that’s independent of BASIC 
MOTIVATION. 
 
4.5 Cognitive Contact with Reality  
We will consider one final motivation for reliabilism that attempts to evade the dilemma we’ve 
presented here for the reliabilist.13 According to this view, what is epistemically valuable is a kind 
of cognitive contact with reality. Something like this, for instance, is what distinguishes lucky 
guesses from knowledge. So what is it to have cognitive contact with reality? Perhaps, the thought 
goes, we can understand this in terms of reliability. When I know that the bottle is on the table (and 
don’t merely guess correctly that it is), it is because there is some kind of reliable connection 
between the fact that it is on the table and my cognitive state.  
Such a motivation for reliabilism avoids the dilemma we’ve suggested as follows. You 
shouldn’t hold unreliably formed but truth-conducive beliefs because such beliefs wouldn’t be 
justified. And justification can get in the way of the pursuit of truth because justification (that is: 
cognitive contact with reality) is valuable in itself. It is not, then, just the pursuit of true belief that 
matters, because cognitive contact with reality is important in its own right. 
Though this view may escape the dilemma as initially stated, we think it nevertheless runs 
into a closely related one. To see this, note that there are two ways to understand the claim that 
reliability gives one cognitive contact with reality. First, one might say that, whenever one has a 
reliably formed belief, one has cognitive contact with reality. But that view isn’t plausible, we think, 
because there can be reliably formed beliefs that are false. When one has a reliably formed but 
                                               
13 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer from this journal for prompting us to think about this kind of view. 
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false belief, one surely doesn’t have any contact with reality. 
The other option, then, is that one has cognitive contact with reality when one has a reliably 
formed true belief. But if that is what is valuable, then surely you should take the following trade-
off: form a belief via an unreliable process now that leads to many more reliably produced true 
beliefs later. The dilemma, then, isn’t really escaped. Such a reliabilist will hold on to reliabilism’s 
prohibition against unreliably formed beliefs. But she will have to do so even when these unreliably 
formed beliefs are conducive to giving the believer cognitive contact with reality. In so doing, she 
must explain why we should allow the pursuit of justification to get in the way of the pursuit of 
cognitive contact with reality, while holding that justification is valuable just because it gives one 
cognitive contact with reality. 
 
5. Advice for Former Reliabilists 
Our aim thus far has been a negative one: we have offered an argument to convince true 
reliabilists—those who embrace RELIABILISM because they buy into BASIC MOTIVATION—
not to endorse RELIABILISM. But what are former reliabilists to do if we’re right? 
 
5.1. Epistemic Utilitarianism 
We can’t give anything like a complete answer to this question here. But the broad outline of the 
view that former reliabilists should pursue is already clear. It’s the type of view relied on by 
Goldman in his social epistemology, when suggesting that social practices are to be evaluated by 
how well they raise ‘the aggregate level of [true belief] of an entire community’ (1999: 93). Such 
evaluation is easy to motivate against the background of BASIC MOTIVATION. But what’s 
missing if we surrender RELIABILISM is a framework for evaluating individual agents. The idea 
of evaluating social practices with reference to aggregate true belief doesn’t give us that, or at least 
not directly. By way of concluding this paper, we will therefore offer some advice to former 
reliabilists about how to extract such a framework from Goldman’s idea about evaluating aggregate 
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levels of accuracy. 
Let’s start by considering some desiderata. Since we are assuming that the former reliabilist 
is motivated by BASIC MOTIVATION, we need a framework that’s motivated by the idea that 
true belief is epistemically good and should as such be promoted. Moreover, what we learn from 
AGGREGATION is that, in at least some cases, true belief is best promoted by forming 
unjustified beliefs. So, we need a view that will recommend individuals forming beliefs by 
unreliable methods in cases where so doing increases the aggregate level of true belief. We believe 
the view that fits the bill here is a form of epistemic utilitarianism, on which epistemic agents should 
form beliefs in such a way as to promote true belief across an entire epistemic community—even 
if that means forming beliefs by way of unreliable belief-forming processes. Such a view is easy to 
motivate with reference to BASIC MOTIVATION, and also takes the lesson of BASIC 
TENSION to heart.  
 
5.2. Against Epistemic Egoism  
However, the resulting view might be taken to be obviously incorrect. Consider a recent case 
offered by Julia Driver (2018): 
 
Conrad is the sort of person who consistently offers very bad arguments for his beliefs. 
Almost all of his beliefs are false, and yet he manages, amazingly, to survive. His arguments 
are so bad, in fact, that whenever someone talks to Conrad they end up, for very good reason, 
believing the opposite of Conrad’s conclusions. Since Conrad’s conclusions are invariably 
false, his interlocutors always come away with true beliefs (Driver 2018: 119). 
 
Driver goes on to suggest that ‘[o]ne is better off epistemically, if one deviates from Conrad’s set 
of beliefs. It would be very odd, then to view Conrad as a good epistemic agent in virtue of the 
fact that wherever he goes, true beliefs are produced’ (119). The idea is that Conrad isn’t doing 
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well epistemically even though he brings about an abundance of true belief in, since none of those 
beliefs are good for Conrad.  
We think that this is correct. And it might be taken to suggest the following argument: if 
Conrad isn’t doing well epistemically, he’s not doing what he (epistemically) should be doing; hence, 
acknowledging that Conrad isn’t doing well is incompatible with epistemic utilitarianism. But that’s 
not right. What Driver’s case makes plausible is that epistemic goods are what Smith (2003) refers 
to as relative goods. Goodness is relative in this way just in case its existence presupposes a relation 
between something (in our case, true belief) and a particular person (say, Conrad). On this picture, 
there is not just this good thing (a true belief) that Conrad happens to have. Rather, the epistemic 
goodness is inherent in the relation between Conrad and his true belief: his true belief is good-for-
Conrad.14 If that’s so, we can account for why it seems wrong to say about Conrad that he’s doing 
well, just because he’s the cause of many true beliefs; since (let’s assume) none of those true beliefs 
belong to him, they are not good-for-him and he’s not doing epistemically well.  
The reason that this doesn’t generate a problem for the epistemic utilitarian is that we don’t 
necessarily settle the question of what you should do by finding out what’s good for you. It might be 
that you sometimes should do things that aren’t good for you. Of course, in ethics, this is exactly 
the claim denied by the ethical egoist, so the view the epistemic utilitarian needs to show 
implausible here would be an analogous form of epistemic egoism, on which you should only 
promote what’s epistemically good for you. We think there are reasons to reject that position, and 
to deny in particular that the only thing that an agent is epistemically obligated to promote are 
those things that are epistemically good for that agent. 
                                               
14 Smith introduces relative goods as a way to reject Moore’s (1988/1902: sec. 59) argument to the effect that ethical 
egoism is self-defeating. It is slightly surprising, perhaps, that we—as will be clear in a moment—want to make use of 
the same concept to defend epistemic utilitarianism against epistemic egoism. We explain this more below. 
Forthcoming in Episteme 
26 
 
To begin with, to claim that an agent is only epistemically obligated to promote what is 
epistemically good for her would be to claim that there is something special about one’s own good, 
as far as what deserves to be promoted. But this is ad hoc. To assign such special status to one’s 
own good would be to deny Sidgwick’s (1981/1874) second axiom about goodness: ‘as a rational 
being I am bound to aim at good generally—so far as it is attainable by my efforts—not at a 
particular part of it’ (382). To aim only at what is good-for-me is to aim at only a particular part of 
the good—which raises a question: why only aim at that part? 
Smith (2003) has an answer when it comes to his preferred account of moral goodness. It 
appeals to his particular dispositional theory of moral value. For Smith, when someone judges p’s 
being the case to be good-for-her what she believes is that she would desire that p if she had a 
maximally informed and coherent and unified set of desires. So, if I judge that p is good-for-me, it 
is built in that I desire that p. But if I judge that p is good-for-you, I believe that if you had a 
maximally informed and coherent and unified set of desires then you would desire that p. My 
judging that p is good-for-me, then, makes a claim on me (via my desires) that my judging that p is 
good-for-you does not, since the latter is about what I think about your desires, and not about my 
own. For Smith, if something does not make a claim on me it cannot generate obligations for me. 
So, he has a story about why I am obligated to promote what is good-for-me, but not what is 
good-for-you.  
But absent any reason to posit such a dispositional theory about epistemic value, this kind 
of response doesn’t work and the ad hoc worry raised above still stands. And so long as this ad hoc 
worry stands, the operative norm for the reliabilist is the one given by BASIC MOTIVATION: 
that true belief is good, and as such should be promoted. That some goods are good-for-you while 
others are good-for-others doesn’t make a difference as such to what you should promote, and 
there will be at least some cases where your reasons to promote some goods over others work out 
in such a way that you are obligated to promote what’s good-for-others even if that’s not good-
for-you. But if that’s so, then epistemic egoism is false. 




5.3. Interpersonal Trade-offs 
Of course, the fact that the epistemic egoist’s approach to epistemic obligation is mistaken does 
not entail that epistemic utilitarianism is true, or even that it’s in the final analysis plausible. In 
order to defend a fully utilitarian view in epistemology, we would have to argue that, in any 
situation, epistemic agents epistemically ought to promote the aggregate epistemic good. By way 
of illustration, return to Conrad. Is he doing well epistemically? No, and the reason is that epistemic 
goods are relative goods. Is he obligated to be the highly effective anti-expert that he is? On 
epistemic utilitarianism, he might be. Just consider all of the epistemic good he generates. Surely, 
these give him some epistemic reason to be the anti-expert that he is.15 
Of course, having reason to do something doesn’t mean you’re obligated to do it. Depending 
on how we imagine the broader context in which Conrad operates, judgments about his being 
obligated to be the type of anti-expert he is become more or less plausible. Say, for example, that 
all of his bad arguments can be traced back to one fundamental misunderstanding that is fairly 
easy to correct. If so, there’s a nearby possible world in which Conrad offers good arguments, and 
as such makes a valuable epistemic contribution to his community, without having to be as badly 
off epistemically as in the world Driver imagines. If that’s so, maybe what he should be doing is 
to correct that misunderstanding. However, if we assume that any (sufficiently) nearby possible 
world in which he’s not an anti-expert is epistemically inferior to the one in which he is by a wide 
enough margin—the aggregate level of true belief in these alternative worlds are substantially 
deflated, say—then an epistemic utilitarian will say that Conrad should do what he’s doing, even 
if he is thereby personally doing epistemically very poorly. (This is compatible with there being 
                                               
15 And, as argued above, that point holds even if all epistemic goods are relative goods; it simply doesn’t follow from 
all epistemic goods being relative goods that each agent only has reason to promote what’s good-for-her.  
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ample—and overriding—moral considerations against that arrangement, but that’s a matter for 
ethics, not epistemology, to arbitrate.)  
What this gets to is the possibility of interpersonal epistemic trade: in at least some cases, 
promoting the aggregate level of true belief calls for trading off the epistemic welfare of some for 
the benefit of raising that aggregate level. That possibility makes sense, given the trajectory of the 
reliabilist’s chain of commitments. Again, reliabilists avoid intrapersonal trade-offs because 
RELIABILISM entails SIDE-CONSTRAINTS, but the latter sits uncomfortably with her 
commitment to BASIC MOTIVATION and should therefore be rejected. Instead, the way for 
former reliabilists to honor BASIC MOTIVATION is to hold, with the epistemic utilitarian, that 
agents should promote the aggregate level of true belief—including in cases where that’s not 
epistemically good for them (or: good-for-them). Hence, the possibility of interpersonal trade-offs 
sanctioned by the epistemic utilitarian. 
Fully pursuing the implications of this utilitarian framework goes beyond the scope of this 
paper, as it would involve delicate questions about how to think about the aggregate epistemic 
good and the specific merits of different trade-offs. What seems clear, however, is that true 
reliabilists should surrender reliabilism for epistemic utilitarianism. More specifically, any plausible 
form of epistemic utilitarianism needs to hold that epistemic goods are relative goods—only then 
will they be able to make plausible judgments about how well individual agents are doing—and 
individual agents should believe in ways that will promote the aggregate level of true belief in her 
community, understood along the lines of Goldman’s framework for evaluating social institutions 
from an epistemic point of view. Making these points doesn’t show that epistemic utilitarianism is 
true. But it provides the direction that former reliabilists should go. 
 
5. Conclusion 
Our main aim in this paper has been to offer an argument to convince true reliabilists—those who 
embrace RELIABILISM because they buy into BASIC MOTIVATION—not to endorse 
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RELIABILISM. Additionally, we have offered some advice for former reliabilists, in suggesting 
that they should pursue a form of epistemic utilitarianism, on which we sometimes should promote 
the good of others, including our epistemic community as a whole. We have not, however, offered 
a full-blown defense of epistemic utilitarianism, a crucial component of which would involve a 
mapping out of the type of interpersonal trade-offs that would be called for on that view. Still, it’s 
our hope that what we have done here helps motivate a sustained and systematic investigation into 
the merits of epistemic utilitarianism in potentially dislodging reliabilism from its position as one 
of the most influential views in epistemology over the past couple of decades. 
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